Nissan's keiretsu 1956-1970 by Anderson, Evelyn
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Nissan’s keiretsu 1956-1970
Evelyn Anderson
Australian Catholic University
December 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8195/
MPRA Paper No. 8195, posted 10. April 2008 05:35 UTC
 Nissan’s Keiretsu, 1956-1970 
Evelyn Anderson 
 
Because Toyota symbolizes the miraculous success of the Japanese 
automobile industry as a whole, scholars have thoroughly documented 
the nature of Toyota’s business strategy and its keiretsu.1 In contrast, 
literature exploring the nature of Nissan’s keiretsu and its business 
strategy was almost non-existent in the 1990s. The assumption was that 
the two keiretsu were identical, with similar characteristics, differences 
being a matter of degree.2 In this paper, I argue that the Provisional Act 
for the Promotion of the Machinery Industry (the Provisional Act or 
Kishinho), 1956-1970, enacted by the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI),  provided Nissan with incentives to vertically integrate 
some of its most important keiretsu firms; during these fifteen years, 
Nissan adopted hierarchy.  I document how the Nissan keiretsu evolved 
in the period coinciding with the Provisional Act and how it differed from 
the Toyota keiretsu. Toyota’s inter-firm relationship with its core 
keiretsu members was  built on trust and organizational capability, 
whereas Nissan’s initial postwar strategy was similar to Toyota’s only in 
name. Contrary to common belief, Nissan’s governance in this period was 
driven by transaction cost considerations in the absence of trust. 
                                                   
1 Yoshiro Miwa, “Shitauke Kankei: Jidousha Sangyou” [Subcontracting Relationship: 
Automobile Industry], in Nihon no kigyou [Japanese Corporations], ed. Kenji Imai 
and Ryu Komiya (Tokyo, 1989), 163-86; James P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones, and 
Daniel Roos, The Machine That Changed the World (New York, 1990); Kazuo Wada, 
“Jidousha sangyou ni okeru kaisouteki kigyou kankei no keisei: Toyota Jidousha no 
jirei [The Formation of a Vertical Relationship in the Automobile Industry: Toyota as 
a Case Study],”Keiei Shigaku [Japan Business History Review] 26, no. 2  (1991): 1-
27. 
2 As Kazuo Wada wrote, “Why focus on Toyota? Because it is the largest assembler in 
Japan, and it is reputed to have maintained the best relations with its suppliers, and 
in the most effective manner. By taking up the case of a trendsetter (thus, an 
extreme) company instead of an average (in that sense, typical) one, I thought I 
could put the problem into sharper relief.” See  Kazuo Wada, “The Development of 
Tiered Inter-Firm Relationships in the Automobile Industry: A Case Study of Toyota 
Motor Corporation,” in Organizational Capability and Competitive Advantage, ed. 
William Lazonick and William Mass (Brookfield, Vt., 1995), 451-75, quotation at p. 
452. 
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Keiretsu 
Keiretsu is a post–World War II phenomenon in the Japanese automobile 
industry. The term first appeared as a significant event in July 1952 when the 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Planning Bureau (Chuushou Kigyou 
Kikakuchou) issued guidelines for a program called “Keiretsu Shindan” 
(Keiretsu Diagnosis). This program targeted SMEs in the general machinery 
industry for productivity improvement. The objectives of the Keiretsu 
Diagnosis were to:  
investigate the extent to which auto assemblers were dependent on 
their supplier network, and the extent to which the suppliers could 
meet the management needs of their customers;  
study how supplier relationship impacted on the management of 
both parties;  
analyze and to manage the complementary relationship between the 
auto assemblers and their supplier network;  
identify the special features and areas for improvement of this 
mutual relationship; 
improve the transaction methods between the two parties based on 
the findings of the diagnosis;  
provide guidelines for the parts suppliers;  
overcome the issues of under capitalization and input shortage;  
promote co-operation between the assemblers and the suppliers;  
improve general management; and  
raise the economic standing of the components suppliers who were 
predominantly SMEs.3
Toyota was the first automobile assembler to participate in this program 
in September of 1952. Nissan joined the program one year later. Six other 
assemblers also took part, and the program concluded in 1958 with 
Mitsubishi as the last participant.4
Under the Keiretsu Diagnosis program, employees from the Aichi 
Industry Guidance Office and the Nagoya Industrial Technology Testing 
Centre visited a parts supplier and spent several days reporting on how each 
factory fared in terms of production and management efficiency. An 
employee from an auto assembler’s Purchasing Department would 
accompany such inspections. The entourage collected information on the 
supplier’s sales and cost of production for diagnosis and analysis. Advice was 
given on management, production, personnel relations, sales, and purchases, 
financial management, accounting, and testing/research. Company 
performance was evaluated using these criteria in a ranking order of A to E, 
                                                   
3 Nihon Jidousha Kaigisho, ed., Jidousha Nenkan [Automotive Yearbook] (Tokyo, 
1954), 19-20. 
4 Kenjo Kan, “Keiretsu Shindan,” Chuushou Kigyou [Small-Medium Enterprises] 11 
(1959): 30-35, quotation at p. 30. 
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with A being the highest. Publicizing the results stimulated competition 
among the suppliers.5
Various cooperative associations (kyouryokukai) were established around 
this time. Each assembler had its own association. The Nissan association, 
comprised of parts makers in the Yokohama district, was the Takara-kai. In 
1954, Nissan shifted its Purchasing Department in Yoshihara to Yokohama, 
and the suppliers in the Yokohama area decided to band together to form the 
Takara-kai, which at first held only social functions. It developed into a 
keiretsu network in 1958, two years after the implementation of the first 
Provisional Act.6 The Takara-kai members were small-scale operators, but 
they were keen to acquire the latest, most efficient management “know-how.” 
Several divisions were formed, each catering to a different trade. Each 
division invited representatives from Nissan and other well-known 
authorities to give lectures and seminars. Member companies also took turns 
sharing new knowledge that would improve production and management. In 
1959, Nissan developed a Quality Control (QC) concept that won the 
assembler the prestigious Deming Prize in the following year, an industry 
first for auto assemblers. The Takara-kai was a useful vehicle for co-
coordinating the production activities of member firms so that the network 
acted as a united whole.7
Toyota has the oldest cooperative association and the only association 
formed before the Second World War. The company itself was founded in 
1937 and two years later, in 1939, Kyouhou-kai was established with thirty-
one founding members.8 Kyouhou-kai is the least exclusive association, with 
some club members belonging to several other associations. For example, 
Nippon Denso and Aishin Seiki, both core members of the Toyota Group, 
belonged to two other associations in 1968. While Nippon Denso also 
belonged to Mitsubishi’s Kashiwa-kai and Isuzu’s Kyouwa Bukai, Aishin Seiki 
was a member of both Kashiwa-kai and Hino Jidousha Kyoukai. This means 
that Toyota was not an exclusive customer of Nippon Denso and Aishin Seiki; 
we could not say the same of Nissan’s Takara-kai members, however. For 
                                                   
5 Kazuo Wada, “Jidousha sangyou ni okeru kaisouteki kigyou kankei no keisei 
industry,” 14. 
6 Jidousha Buhin Kougyoukai, Ooto Toreedo Jaanaru, ed., Nihon no Jidousha Buhin 
Kougyou [Japan’s Automotive Components Industry] (Tokyo, 1968), 279. 
7 Nihon Jidousha Kaigisho, ed., Jidousha Nenkan [Automotive Yearbook] (Tokyo, 
1972), 276-78; Nissan Jidousha Kabushiki Kaisha Shashi Hensan Iinkai [Editorial 
Committee of Company History, Nissan Automobile Company], ed., Nissan  
Jidousha Shashi 1964-1973 [Nissan Company History, 1964-1973] (Tokyo, 1975), 57-
59. 
8 Yoshio Ooba, Nihon Jidousha Sangyou no Seiritsu to Jidousha Seizou Gyouhou no 
Kenkyuu [A Study on the Japanese Automobile Industry, Its Establishment and 
Legislation Affecting the Manufacturing of Automobiles] (Tokyo, 2001), 308. 
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example, Atsugi Automotive Parts and Kantou Seiki were the core members 
of Takara-kai (exclusively so in 1969).9
The keiretsu phenomenon coincided with the MITI legislation, and 
keiretsu became the generic name of the assemblers’ cooperative 
associations. Kyouhou-kai was often referred to as the Toyota Keiretsu, the 
Takara-kai as the Nissan Keiretsu, and so forth. Trade journals began closely 
following the development of the various keiretsu affiliated with each major 
auto assembler, systematically documenting them in 1961, the beginning of 
the second five-year period of the Provisional Act.10 From 1963 on, trade 
journals such as the Automotive Yearbook devoted their financial and 
production sections to the analysis and detailed reports of assembler-based 
keiretsu. 
The Nissan Business Model 
Nissan Motor Corporation (Nissan Jidousha Kabushiki Kaisha) was founded 
on December 27, 1928, with an initial capital of 50 million yen raised in the 
stock market. The company’s founder was adept at buying small to medium 
companies and growing them. 
Nissan’s company history documented the assembler’s philosophy in 1928 
as follows: 
The parent company exercises vertical control at the top of a pyramid 
comprising of subsidiaries below. The parent provides these 
functions to the subsidiaries; control, guidance and assistance. 
   Nissan’s founder wanted to model the company on world-renowned 
corporations such as Standard Oil, U.S. Steel, and Du Pont. These 
companies were well capitalized, and they have expanded by 
investing and owning shares in subsidiaries established in related 
industries. Nissan’s founder was also a great admirer of the growth 
strategy used by U.S. chain stores and cartels. The Nissan strategies 
were to spin off new units as the company expanded, and then grow 
each one of them through scale economy and efficiency 
improvement. Profit margins would improve with cost reduction. The 
parent company should exercise complete control and command over 
their subsidiaries.11
Statistics confirm Nissan’s initial governance as hierarchical. The in-house 
production ratio for Nissan was 50 percent in 1936, rising to 68 percent in 
1952.12 How did a vertical integration strategy develop into what seems to be 
                                                   
9 Nihon Jidousha Kaigisho, ed., Jidousha Nenkan [Automotive Yearbook] (Tokyo, 
1968-69), 268-348. 
10 Nihon Jidousha Kaigisho, ed., Jidousha Nenkan [Automotive Yearbook] (Tokyo, 
1961), 11. 
11 Nissan Jidousha Kabushiki Kaisha Shashi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Nissan Jidousha 
Shashi 1964-1973, 35. 
12 Yoshio Ooba, Nihon Jidousha Sangyou no Seiritsu to Jidousha Seizou Gyouhou 
no Kenkyuu, 311; Nihon Jidousha Kaigisho, ed., Jidousha Nenkan [Automotive 
Year-book] (Tokyo, 1955), 79-83. 
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an outsourcing strategy after 1956? The answer to this question lies in the 
Japanese economic environment before and just after the Second World War, 
which gave shape to Nissan’s postwar business strategy. 
The government granted Nissan special status before the war. In 1936, the 
company was one of only two “approved” companies (along with Toyota) 
permitted to manufacture automotive vehicles.13 However, Nissan lost favor 
with the government after the war. The administration preferred Toyota, 
which proposed total self-reliance (the so-called 100 percent homegrown 
technology, or jun kokusan gijutsu). MITI favored “domestic” technology 
over “foreign” technology after the war because of one important postwar 
economic feature: Japan had developed a persistent shortage of foreign 
reserves. Japan’s import policy reached a turning point in 1952. The boom 
brought about by the Army Procurement for America (APA) orders led to a 
serious current account deficit. The war destroyed many of the capital goods 
used in the automobile industry, necessitating the import of the latest 
machinery to keep pace with the dramatic rise in demand from the United 
States for special orders of trucks and cars. The automobile industry was a 
heavy user of imported technology. Consequently, the balance of payments 
deteriorated rapidly in 1952, as imports outstripped exports. The expectation 
that more U.S. imports would be required to meet U.S. APA orders created 
anticipation of a further deterioration of the current account deficit. The 
government began to impose various restrictions on automobile-related 
imports.14
Nissan was the first casualty of this new import policy. In 1952, the 
company requested a foreign reserve allocation of 180 million yen to import 
200 press machines.15  The Bank of Japan rejected Nissan’s application and 
refused to alter its restrictive policy concerning foreign currency control. 
Nissan had lost its “special status” because its initial postwar strategy was to 
“import” foreign technology through a technology transfer agreement with 
Austin. The company could not access foreign reserves to pay for critical 
technology in 1952. After the enactment of the Kishinhou, scarce foreign 
reserves for the payment of imported foreign technology were allocated to 
components makers only.  In addition, the parts suppliers could borrow at a 
lower interest rate.  Would Nissan “spin off” internal departments, so they 
could pose as “sub-contracting components firms” in order to secure the 
benefits denied the parent company, simply for being an assembler? Would it 
want to internalize and regain more of its important production functions by 
acquiring a controlling interest in some of these firms, once the act expired? 
                                                   
13 Jidousha Buhin Kougyoukai, Ooto Toreedo Jaanaru, ed., Nihon no Jidousha Buhin 
Kougyou [Japan’s Automotive Components Industry] (Tokyo, 1963), 29. 
14 Nihon Jidousha Kougyou Kai, Nihon Jidousha Sangyou Shi [History of the 
Japanese Automobile Industry] (Tokyo, 1963), 102. 
15 Nihon Jidousha Kaigisho, ed., Jidousha Nenkan [Automotive Yearbook] (Tokyo, 
1954), 303. 
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Nissan’s Relationship with Its Core Keiretsu Firms: A 
Comparison with Toyota 
Mr. Ohta, Managing Director of Nissan, stated during a 1971 interview: 
Atsugi Automotive Parts, Kantou Seiki and Nihon Radiator are more 
than 50 percent owned by Nissan. They are in fact Nissan’s 
subsidiaries or internal divisions according to U.S. definitions. 
Therefore, the in-house production ratio for Nissan is not 30 percent-
40 percent, but 45 percent-55 percent.16
The Spin-Off Strategy of Toyota and Nissan: Deceptive Similarity 
Toyota spun off six companies between 1940 and 1949 in order to diversify 
risk and to concentrate on its core capabilities (see Table 1). Nissan had spun 
off two companies and bought two more (see Table 2). At first glance, both 
Toyota and Nissan had spun off companies that were comparable in 
technological and strategic importance. However, the similarity ends when 
we analyze the situation more closely using the Provisional Act as a backdrop. 
     With respect to Toyota, all the spun-off companies were once internal 
divisions, and separation occurred long before there was even discussion of a 
Provisional Act. The last company to gain independence from Toyota was 
Nippon Denso in 1949, seven years before MITI legislated the Kishinhou.  
 
TABLE 1 
Toyota’s Spin-off Strategy for Financial Survival 
 
Companies 
spun off 
Date of 
separation/independence 
Remarks 
Toyota Shatai 1945 Car bodies manufacturing 
Toyota Kouki May 1, 1941 Engineering and 
machinery 
Aichi Seikou 1940 Steel maker 
Aichi Kougyou March 1943 Joint venture with 
Kawasaki airplane. 
Capitalization: 50 million 
yen 
Nippon Denso 1949 Electrical components 
Toyota Motors 
Sales (TMS) 
 Forced to spin-off TMS as 
a condition of financial 
rescue 
 
Source: Kousei Torihiki Kyoukai [Fair Trade Association], Jidousha kougyou no 
keizairyoku shuuchuu no jittai [Concentration and Market Power in the Automobile 
Industry] (Tokyo, 1959), 76-77. 
                                                   
16 Jidousha Buhin Kougyoukai, Ooto Toreedo Jaanaru, ed., Nihon no Jidousha Buhin 
Kougyou [Japan’s Automotive Components Industry] (Tokyo, 1971), 101-2. 
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TABLE 2 
Nissan Spin-off Strategy 
 
Companies 
spun 
off/created 
Date 
Separated/Established/ 
Purchased 
Remarks 
Tokyo Seikoujo Dec. 17, 1954 
This steel maker was established 
in order to satisfy Nissan’s union 
demand 
Atsugi 
Automotive Parts 
May 30, 1956 
Spun off from an internal Nissan 
division based in its Atsugi 
factory; capitalized at 45 million 
yen. 
Kantou Seiki Oct. 25, 1956 
Spun off from Nissan despite 
achieving an excellent technical 
standard in the manufacture of 
measurement instruments; 
capitalized at 25 million yen. 
Nihon Radiator April 1954 
Nissan bought 60% of 
company’s shares to secure the 
supply of radiators. 
 
Source: Nissan Jidousha Kabushiki Kaisha Soumubu [General Affairs Section, 
Nissan Automotive Corporation], Nissan Jidousha Sanjuu-nenshi [30-Year History 
of Nissan Automotive] (Yokohama, 1965), 338-40. 
 
Toyota shed those companies as part of a survival strategy, mired as it was in  
financial trouble during the harsh war environment and its immediate 
aftermath.17
 
In contrast, Nissan seemed to have different reasons for taking similar 
actions. Both Atsugi Automotive Parts (Atsugi) and Kantou Seiki were spun-
off coincident with the legislation of the Kishinhou. In the boom year, 1956, 
with the expectation that the domestic car industry would grow further, risk 
diversification could not have been a consideration. Nor would a firm’s 
strategy to concentrate its scarce financial resources on developing its core 
capabilities seem a likely motivation, for Nissan had sufficient funds to own 
both companies and Nihon Radiator. 
Nissan’s Relationship with Its Core Keiretsu Members 
Atsugi was 99 percent owned by Nissan, with an initial capital of 45 million 
yen, 5 million yen below the Provisional Act’s threshold of 50 million for 
foreign reserves allocation and MITI approval for low interest rate loans (see 
                                                   
17 Evelyn Anderson, “The Enigma of Toyota’s Competitive Advantage: Is Denso the 
Missing Link in the Academic Literature?” Pacific Economic Papers, 339 (2003): 1-
45, esp.  pp. 10-15. 
lyn Anderson//Ni san’s Keiretsu, 1956-1970
Evelyn Anderson // Nissan’s Keiretsu, 1956-1970 8 
Table 3). The original manufacturing products at Atsugi were screws, nails, 
and bolts. These do not involve “cutting-edge” technology, but do benefit 
from economies of scale, and complied with three categories of the 
designated machinery approved by MITI. The firm won nine MITI grants, 
and it supplied Nissan and Nissan-related companies (the Nissan-ken or 
Nissan Circle), exclusively. Nissan leased seventeen pieces of machinery to 
the new company, and outsourced all of its propeller shafts, 40 assembly 
items, and 93 related assembly items to Atsugi.  The company later 
diversified into critical technology such as the manufacturing of pistons, oil 
pumps, clutches, suction mats, and propeller shafts. By 1971, screws, nails, 
pins, and bolts constituted only 2 percent of the company’s output, and 
Atsugi manufactured some of the main items, such as electrical and control 
mechanisms, in competition with Nippon Denso. 
Like Atsugi, Kantou Seiki was a separate company (founded in 1956), but 
capitalized at 25 million yen. Nissan owned 98.2 percent of this company. 
The company originally manufactured meters and measurement instruments, 
classified as category 15 in the MITI machinery approval list, and won eight 
MITI grants. In 1958, MITI designated this company as a model factory for 
meter measurements. As a result, the company was able to purchase the 
latest machinery and to modernize its production lines. 
Nihon Radiator, established in 1938, initially manufactured radiators and 
mufflers for Ford, Shiboree, and Diamond.18 It was renamed Nihon Radiator 
in 1952. Nissan bought 60 percent of Nihon Radiator’s shares in an effort to 
secure a supply of radiators in 1955. Nissan appointed its deputy chief from 
its Yokohama Plant to become the managing director of Nihon Radiator in 
May of that year. In June, Nihon Radiator signed a contract to sell all of its 
radiators to Nissan. Like the other two companies, Nihon Radiator was in 
effect Nissan’s subsidiary. The company won nine MITI grants in the first ten 
years of the Kishinhou period, and the prestigious Deming Prize in 1959, one 
year before Nissan itself received the same prize. 
Nissan’s equity in Atsugi and Kantou Seiki declined steadily from 1956 to 
1971 (from 99 percent to 70.13 percent for Atsugi and from 98.2 percent to 93 
percent for Kantou Seiki) (see Table 4). Sales to Nissan, in the case of Kantou 
Seiki, also showed a falling trend. Kantou Seiki had diversified 12 percent of 
its products to other buyers by 1971. On the other hand, Nissan increased its 
shares in Nihon Radiator from 55 percent in 1956 to 62 percent in 1971. 
Nihon Radiator also diversified its customers, selling 16 percent of its 
products to other companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
18 Nissan Jidousha Kabushiki Kaisha Soumubu, Nissan Jidousha Sanjuu-nenshi  
[30-Year History of Nissan Automotive] (Yokohama, 1965), 338. 
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TABLE 3 
Nissan’s Initial Equity in Its Core Keiretsu, October 1957 
 
Keiretsu firm Equity 
(%) 
Remarks 
Atsugi 
Automotive 
Parts 
99.0 
Two Nissan executives were appointed to 
head this Nissan-financed company. 
Kantou Seiki 98.2 
One Nissan executive was appointed to 
company management. Nissan finance 
available. 
Nihon Radiator 55.0 Nissan finance available. 
 
Source: Kousei Torihiki Kyoukai [Fair Trade Association], Jidousha kougyou no 
keizairyoku shuuchuu no jittai [Concentration and Market Power in the Automobile 
Industry] (Tokyo, 1959), 94-95. 
 
Nissan’s Relationship with Its Extended Keiretsu Firms 
Nissan’s core keiretsu firms had won multiple MITI grants. Likewise, 
Nissan’s investment in its extended keiretsu members shows a high level of 
correlation with MITI grants. Three numbers are worthy of attention. 
Japanese corporate law defines the minimum for control as a 25 percent 
stake held by an assembler in its keiretsu member. At this level, the 
shareholder can initiate proposals for policy consideration. A 33 percent 
stake will give the assembler sufficient control, for the chair of the 
shareholders’ meeting rarely rejects such proposals. A 50 percent or above 
stake constitutes a definite controlling interest. 
 
 
TABLE 4 
Asset Specificity (Exclusiveness) of Nissan’s Keiretsu in 1971 
 
Core keiretsu firms 
Nissan’s equity 
of keiretsu 
firms (%) 
Exclusiveness: 
Nissan’s share of 
keiretsu firm’s sales 
(%) 
Atsugi Automotive Parts 70 100 
Kantou Seiki 93 88 
Nihon Radiator 62 86 
 
Source: Ohkurasho [Ministry of Finance], Yuuka Shouken Houkokusho [Stock and 
Shares Report] (Tokyo, 1971). 
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FIGURE 1 
   Nissan Shareholding and Controlling Interest in Relation to MITI Grants in 1970 
                                                                         
                                                                                  45 Companies in Nissan’s Keiretsu 
 
 
     
                                                     37 Companies     8 Companies 
    Complete Data (82%)    Data Incomplete  (18%) 
          
 
 
 
  
27 Companies received MITI grants (73%)                     10 Companies without MITI grants  (17%) 
        
 
 
 
Nissan shares   Nissan shares  Nissan shares    Nissan shares 
< 25%    >25%   <25%     >25% 
=12 Companies   =15 Companies  =3 Companies    = 7 Companies 
(44%)    (56%)   (30%)     (70%) 
 
Akebono Brakes  * Atsugi Parts       * Aichi Kikai 
Diesel Machines  * Daikin Seisaku Central Glass    * Nissan Kouki   
Jidousha Denki Kougyou      Fuji Kikou  Fuji Juuko    * Shin Nihon Tanko 
Jidousha Kiki   * Ikeda Bussan  Nihon Seiko    * Tokyo Sokuhan 
Kayaba Kougyou  * Kantou Seiki       * Nihon Daiyakurebaito 
Nihon Kikai Seisakujo  * Nairusu Parts           Fuji Tekko 
Puresu Kougyou  * Nihon Radiators         Nihon Jidou Hensokuki 
Shikou Kougyou  * Ooi Seisakujo                    
Tochigi Fuji Kougyou  * Tsuchiya Seisakujo                    
Tokiko       Kinugawa Gomu                    
Topii       Nihon Purasuto                    
Nihon Tokushu Tougyou Hashimoto Foaming 
       Yamakawa Kougyou 
       Yamato Kougyou 
       Yorozu Jidousha 
 
Notes: *Nissan’s shares in these companies exceeded 33 percent, which constitute a sufficient 
controlling interest according to Japanese corporate law.  The eight companies with incomplete 
data are Ichikawa Seisakujo, Sharin Kougyou, Teikoku Denpa, Higashi Nihon Tanko, Hitachi 
Kinsoku Kougyou, Hitachi Seisakujo, Yokohama Gomu, and Tokyo Puresu Kougyou. 
 
Sources:  Toshichika Matsui, “Jidousha Kougyou ni okeru shitauke / keiretsuka no jittai 
(jyou) – motokata fukusuuka dankai no kigyou keiretsu nit suite” [Sub-contracting and 
keiretsu in the automotive industry (Part I) – corporate keiretsu seeking customer 
diversification] “ Ritsumeikan Keieigaku [Ritsumeikan Management Studies] 12 (Sept. 1973): 
21-70, esp. 62-70; Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, Kaisha Nenkan [Corporation Annual Reports] 
(Tokyo, various years); Jidousha Buhin Kougyoukai, Ooto Toreedo Jaanaru, ed., Nihon no 
Jidousha Buhin Kougyou [Japan’s Automotive Components Industry] (Tokyo, various years); 
Ohkurasho  [Ministry of Finance], Yuuka Shouken Houkokusho [Stock and Shares Report] 
(Tokyo, various years); Shuuji Yamazaki, Sengo Nihon no Jidousha Sangyou Seisaku 
[Postwar Industrial Policy for the Japanese Automobile Industry] (Kyoto, 2003); 
questionnaires and interviews with Mr. Fujiki, who headed Nissan’s Car Parts Purchasing 
Division.  
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Figure 1 shows that in 1970, 73 percent of Nissan’s investment was found 
in firms that had received MITI grants, in 56 percent of which Nissan had a 
minimum controlling interest of over 25 percent. Nissan had sufficient 
controlling interest in 53 percent of the firms in which Nissan held more than 
25 percent equity (eight of fifteen companies). 
At the end of the third and final Kishinhou, Nissan held at least 25 percent 
(minimum controlling interest) equity in fifteen companies, eleven of which 
had received direct MITI grants. The remaining four had indirectly received 
MITI grants through mergers and technology cooperation agreements (see 
Figure 1 and Table 5). 
Out of these fifteen companies, nine were new acquisitions made during 
the third Kishinhou period (1966-1970). Of these nine companies, six (67 
percent) were acquired in 1970, the year Kishinhou expired. All nine 
companies had won MITI grants before Nissan bought them. These nine 
companies comprised 19 percent of Nissan’s total investment in 1970. 
Nissan’s investment in the MITI-approved machinery parts suppliers’ 
network slowed significantly in 1971, one year after the Kishinhou 
terminated. The only increase that Nissan made in 1971 was an additional 
investment (227.5 million yen) in Tsuchiya Seisakujo. This contributed to a 2 
percent increase in Nissan’s total investment on a year-on-year basis. In 
contrast, Nissan’s investment in the same group of companies during the 
third Kishinhou period rose at an average rate of 32 percent on a year-on-
year basis. 
 
TABLE 5 
Automotive Components Keiretsu Firms Receiving MITI Grants (Nissan 
Stake a Minimum of 25%), 1970 
 
Company 
No. of MITI 
Grants 
Nihon Radiator 9 
Atsugi Parts 9 
Kanto Seiki 8 
Daikin Seisakujo 11 
Fuji Kikou 1 
Nihon Purasuto 1 
Ohi Seisakujo 2 
Niles Parts 9 
Ikeda Bussan 5 
Tsuchiya Seisakujo 8 
Kinugawa Gomu 7 
 
Source: Shuuji Yamazaki, Sengo Nihon no Jidousha Sangyou Seisaku [Postwar 
Industrial Policy of the Japanese Automobile Industry] (Kyoto, 2003), 59-62. 
Notes: Four had received MITI’s  funding indirectly through mergers: Hashimoto 
Foaming merged with Natori Gomu in 1966 (MITI grant: 1); Yamakawa Kougyou 
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with Nagada Kougyou in 1966 (MITI: 2); Yamato Kougyou with Mitsuike Kougyou in 
1963 (MITI: 1); Yorozu Jidousha Kougyou with Sugimoto Kinzoku in 1967 (MITI: 2). 
    Fuji Kikou merged with Kato Seisakujo in 1966; Kato Seisakujo won one MITI 
grant. Ohi Seisakujo merged with Jonan Seisakujo in 1967; Jonan Seisakujo won 
four MITI grants. 
 
These findings suggest that Nissan purchased a significant number of 
parts suppliers for control just before the Provisional Act expired in 1970. All 
companies either directly or indirectly received MITI grants. There could be 
two reasons for Nissan’s investment behavior. First, Capital Liberalization 
had its commencement year in 1971. Foreign firms could buy Japanese 
companies, including member firms of Nissan’s keiretsu, from 1971 onward. 
Second, Nissan might have bought controlling stakes in important suppliers 
because these companies were “subcontractors” only for the duration of the 
Kishinhou period. They “temporarily” outsourced these for two reasons. 
Nissan needed to overcome the foreign reserve allocation constraint imposed 
by the Bank of Japan, before it could modernize its own capital equipment. In 
addition, parts suppliers had lower borrowing costs relative to assemblers,  
for MITI funding was available only to parts-makers. Nissan might have 
wanted to regain control by purchasing some of the companies that had won 
MITI grants as the final Provisional period ended. Mr. Ohta, managing 
director of Nissan, confirmed that his company would consider raising its in-
house production ratio as of 1971.19 His comment lends additional support to 
the thesis that Nissan had pursued, in essence, a vertical integration strategy 
in the 15-year period during which the Kishinhou was enforced. 
Conclusions 
Focusing our analysis on Nissan’s core and extended keiretsu between 1956 
and 1970 in light of the Provisional Act reveals that during this period:  
a) Nissan’s outsourcing ratio in 1971 in terms of value-added (taking into 
account that the assembler’s core keiretsu were in fact its subsidiaries) was 45 
to 55 percent, not 70 percent as is commonly claimed;  b) Nissan’s acquisition 
strategy throughout the Provisional Act period was positively related to MITI 
grants; and c) a positive correlation existed between Nissan’s controlling 
interest in its keiretsu members (both core and extended) and the exclusive 
relationships that these members had with Nissan. This is indicative that 
Nissan was more vertically integrated (although vertical integration was 
disguised as an outsourcing strategy in order to satisfy MITI’s requirement) 
than has been commonly understood. 
Jeffrey Dyer observes, “Japan has been described as a high trust 
environment,” where inter-firm trust is a key factor that facilitates exchange 
and creates competitive advantages for Japanese firms. Some scholars even 
claim that national economic efficiency is highly correlated with the existence 
                                                   
19 Jidousha Buhin Kougyoukai, Ooto Toreedo Jaanaru, ed., Nihon no Jidousha Buhin 
Kougyou [Japan’s Automotive Components Industry] (Tokyo, 1971), 102. 
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of an institutional environment of high trust.  For example, Francis  
Fukuyama argues that the economic success of a nation, “as well as its ability 
to compete, is conditioned by . . . the level of trust inherent in the society.  
Indeed, numerous scholars have suggested that inter-organizational trust is a 
key factor in explaining the competitive advantage of Japanese firms relative 
to U.S. or U.K. firms.”20  
I show that Nissan’s postwar governance structure might have been 
shaped by ex-ante “distrust” and girdled with asset-specificity by way of 
controlling shareholding investment in their suppliers, who in turn 
committed themselves with dedicated assets to Nissan. Both parties—the 
assembler and the suppliers—cooperated for at least fifteen years while the 
Provisional Act was in force because the MITI legislation provided a common 
interest objective for both to do so. We must therefore regard Dyer’s 
comments with reservation. 
                                                   
20 Ronald Dore, “Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism,” British Journal of 
Sociology 34 (Dec 1983): 459-82; Mari Sako, “The Role of ‘Trust’ in Japanese Buyer-
Supplier Relationships,” Ricerche Economiche 45 (aprile-settembre 1991): 449-74; 
Charles W.L. Hill, “National Institutional Structures, Transaction Cost Economizing, 
and Competitive Advantage: The Case of Japan,”  Organization Science 6, no. 1 
(1995): 119-31; Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge, U.K., 
1990); Mark Casson, Enterprise and Competitiveness: A Systems View of 
International Business (Oxford, 1990);  Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social 
Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York, 1995); Jeffrey H. 
Dyer,”Specialized Supplier Networks as a Source of Competitive Advantage: 
Evidence from the Auto Industry,” Strategic Management Journal 17, no. 4 (1996): 
271-92;  Jeffrey H. Dyer, “The Economic Value of Trust in Supplier-Buyer Relations,” 
MIT Working Paper  no. W-0145a (1998), 1-30, quotation at p. 11. 
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